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The capital flight quadrilemma: Democratic trade-offs and 
international investment
Michael Bennett
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
This article argues that capital flight of real investment presents 
governments with a quadrilemma. First, governments can tailor 
their policies to attract investors – but this is incompatible with 
a whole range of alternative policy choices. Second, they can 
simply accept capital flight – but this is incompatible with 
a robust capital stock and tax base. Third, they can harmonize its 
taxes and regulations with other states – but this is incompatible 
with international independence. Fourth, they can impose capital 
controls – but this is incompatible with international capital mobi-
lity. These incompatibilities make up four different goals, the value 
of which are described. Strategies may be mixed, but the pursuit 
of any three goals must always come at the expense of the fourth.
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On the 2nd of May 2010, the Australian Labour party announced a windfall tax on the 
profits of mining companies. Mining firms immediately began warning that the new tax 
would deter them from investing in Australia, and that this would have disastrous 
consequences for the Australian economy. On the 23rd of June, Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd was ousted by his deputy, Julia Gillard. When she took over from him, one of her 
first acts was to abandon the threatened mining tax, and to implement a much weaker 
alternative instead (Bell and Hindmoor 2014).
The danger of capital flight is one of the most potent and ubiquitous tools in 
contemporary right-wing political discourse. On the left, capital flight is often invoked 
either as an explanation for failure or as evidence of the incompatibility of capitalism 
and democracy.
This article looks at the apparent conflict between private investment decisions and 
democratic decision-making created by capital flight. It does so by describing the space 
of choices available to states and the goals or values that can or cannot be advanced by 
these choices. My central claim is that states face a quadrillematic trade-off. States must 
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choose some mixture of four ideal-typical strategies, each of which satisfies three 
relevant goals but runs directly counter to a fourth goal (see Table 1 below).
First, a state can retain capital mobility, international independence, and a robust 
capital base by tailoring its policies to attract investors – but this precludes a whole 
range of alternative policy choices. Second, a state can retain policies investors dislike, 
alongside capital mobility and international independence, by simply accepting the 
erosion of its capital base – but then they cannot cultivate the capital stock and tax 
base. Third, a state can retain mobility, capital base and investor-limiting policies by 
harmonizing its taxes and regulations with other states – but then they cannot be 
international independent. Finally, a state can retain independence, capital base and 
investor-limiting policies by putting up barriers to capital flows – but this means 
restricting international capital mobility. Pursuing any three of these goals must come 
at the cost of the fourth goal.
The quadrilemma implies that there can be no simple solution to the problem of real 
capital flight. For individual countries, the normative question is how to weigh the 
different goals at stake. This article is devoted to elucidating the structure of this 
normative choice, and although it is informed by research on how states and investors 
have behaved in the recent past, it does not present any new empirical findings.
After some brief background, the four main sections of the article consider each 
strategy in its ideal-typical form, alongside a discussion of the goal with which the 
strategy is incompatible. These goals are not supposed be fundamental moral values in 
themselves. Rather, the goals are merely supposed to be valuable, and I discuss which 
deeper values they serve. These sections have a similar structure: first they describe the 
strategy, then the contradictory goal and why states should be able to pursue that goal, 
and then consider other objections, either to the strategy itself or to its alleged tension 
with the relevant goal. The final section then moves from ideal-typical strategies to 
consider more mixed approaches, summing up the quadrilemma in a graphical 
representation.
Background
Before describing the quadrilemma in detail, I will briefly situate my thesis in the 
existing literature and define the scope of my inquiry more precisely.
The questions I tackle have been raised by two bodies of literature. The general 
phenomenon of private investment influencing democratic decision-making has 
attracted attention under a range of names. Michał Kalecki (1943) wrote about the 










Strategies Investor-friendly policy X ✓ ✓ ✓
Capital base erosion ✓ X ✓ ✓
International 
harmonization
✓ ✓ X ✓
Capital barriers ✓ ✓ ✓ X
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‘state of confidence,’ Charles Lindblom (1977, 1982) the ‘privileged position of busi-
ness,’ Fred Block (1977) (and following him Joshua Cohen (1989)) ‘structural con-
straints,’ Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988) ‘structural dependence,’ Brian Barry (2002) 
‘capitalists having power over the government,’ Thomas Christiano (2010a) the ‘uneasy 
relationship between democracy and capital,’ Stuart White (2011) ‘capital strikes’, and 
Wolfgang Streeck (2017) ‘investment strikes’ – terms that also occur in journalistic 
discussions (‘A Capital Strike’, 2009; Burke 2012; Frase 2011).
In addition, there is growing body of work on ‘tax competition’: strategic tax-setting 
by states to attract internationally mobile capital. Many empirical studies in economics 
and political science have assessed the prevalence of the phenomena. More recently, tax 
competition has also been assessed in normative terms, most notably by Peter Dietsch 
and Thomas Rixen (Van Apeldoorn 2018; See also Avi-Yonah 2000; Dietsch 2015; 
Dietsch and Rixen 2014, 2016; Ronzoni 2009, 2014).
Like the tax competition literature, but unlike the literature on capital strikes, I focus 
specifically on the international context of capital flight. Almost nowhere today has 
anything approaching a closed economy, and, as I will argue below, closed economies 
can largely avoid capital strikes in any case. Unlike the tax competition literature (and 
to a lesser extent the capital strikes literature), I do not focus solely on taxes. Taxes are 
merely the most obvious policies states can change to attract investors.
The author whose works comes closest to my argument is Dani Rodrik (2012). In 
Rodrik’s ‘political trilemma of the world economy’, the incompatible goals are ‘hyper-
globalisation’, ‘democratic politics’ and ‘the nation state’. Rodrik’s thesis is broader than 
mine, referring not only to competition for real investment but to the whole spectrum 
of international economics, including trade, exchange rates and multilateral organiza-
tions. This greater scope understandably comes at the cost of precision regarding 
particular issues. Applied to real capital flight, Rodrik’s three-option model neglects 
a fourth option: simply accepting capital base erosion.
My topic is defined more precisely in several ways. I focus on real investments (FDI), 
rather than ‘hot money’ flows of liquid assets, or ‘virtual capital flight’ of accounting 
profits and portfolio capital. Hot money flows are important primarily for exchange 
rates. They give rise to a well-established ‘monetary policy trilemma’ (‘impossible 
trinity’) that is distinct from the quadrilemma described here (though with some points 
of analogy). Virtual capital flight concerns where profits and assets are located for 
accounting purposes, as distinct from where the underlying real economic activity is 
located. Virtual capital flight raises different normative issues (focusing on how rights to 
tax economic activities should be allocated), and different practical issues (focusing on 
how international co-operation to tackle the problem can be structured) (Dietsch and 
Rixen 2014; Pogge and Mehta 2016).
Real capital flight presents a quadrilemmatic trade-off: four potentially desirable 
goals, only three of which can be fully reached at any point in time. This is 
a quadrilemma in the same sense as Rodrik’s trilemma and the monetary policy 
trilemma. Quad/trilemmas of this sort allow for compromise strategies: a state could 
mix a little of all four strategies to achieve something of all four goals. However, the 
possibility of such compromises does not invalidate the quadrilemmatic structure of 
the choice situation. What makes this structure distinct from trade-offs in general is 
the particular structure in which three goals can be maximized, but never all four. 
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This implies that attempting to improve on one of the goals must come at the 
expense of at least one of the other goals. Graphical representations are introduced 
below to make this clearer.
The quadrilemma thesis is premised on an assumption that investors seek to maximize 
their returns. There are two ways we can imagine this assumption being violated. On the 
one hand, we can imagine that investors might behave more aggressively towards govern-
ments. In the slump of 1937, Franklin Roosevelt suspected a capital strike in a strong sense 
when he thought investors were conspiring to deliberately wreck the economy in order to 
hurt him politically (Kennedy 1999, 352). The moral issues at stake in a deliberate, co- 
ordinated capital strike of this sort would be relatively clear. Capital flight driven purely by 
profit-seeking, on the other hand, is both a morally more complex as well as empirically 
much more common phenomena. I thus refer to capital flight solely in the sense of normal, 
uncoordinated profit-seeking, any political effects of which are by-products.
On the other hand, we can also imagine that investors could be more deferential 
towards government, refraining from shopping around for favourable regulatory 
regimes. At the limit, if investors completely ignored international differences in rates 
of return due to different taxes and regulations, the quadrilemma would cease to hold. 
Although investor restraint can theoretically mitigate the capital flight quadrilemma, 
this is not treated as a significant variable in the empirical literature on topic.
Normatively, the investor self-interest assumption demonstrates the need to distinguish 
carefully between the question of what investors should do in response to government 
policies, and the question of what governments should do.1 The latter question is part of 
nonideal theory in the sense that instead of asking what all actors should do, it asks what 
some actors (states) should do, given empirically plausible assumptions about how other 
actors (investors) are likely to respond.2 The question for states is whether the benefits of 
policies outweigh the costs, given that the distribution of those costs will be affected by 
investors attempting to pass costs on to others. If the state should avoid policies because of 
adverse reactions by private investors, we have a basis for saying that private investment 
impedes a democracy’s ability to choose its policy goals. Assessing this claim is a necessary 
prerequisite for evaluating socialist arguments that we need to socialize investment deci-
sions to protect democratic decision-making (Cohen 1989; White 2011).
Now that we have a clearer idea of our subject, I now proceed to develop my own 
framework, describing each of the ideal-typical strategies and goals which make up the 
quadrilemma.
Investor-friendly policy or investor-limiting policy
I refer to the first ideal-typical strategy as investor-friendly policy: taxes and regulations 
that are conducive to the interests of investors and so attract/retain investment in the 
country. As I define them, investor-friendly policies prioritize gains to relatively mobile 
factors of production (mobile capital) over relatively immobile factors (labour, land, 
immobile capital). By pursuing such policies, states can satisfy three of the four goals of 
1The former question is the subject of Christiano 2010a.
2For this sense of nonideal theory see Lawford-Smith 2013; Robeyns 2008; Stemplowska and Swift 2012; see further 
Swift 2008.
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the quadrilemma: they can cultivate their capital base while retaining capital mobility, 
and without loss of international independence.
It is important to distinguish two different reasons countries might choose investor- 
friendly policies. In the case of deliberate regulatory competition, investor-friendly 
policies are adopted with the specific goal of attracting investment from other countries. 
This is exemplified by Ireland, which cut its corporate tax rate to 10% with the explicit 
goal of attracting foreign direct investment (Dietsch and Rixen 2014, 161).
However, we cannot assume that all investor-friendly policies are instances of 
regulatory competition. Some countries might choose a smaller state just because they 
judge that kind of society to be better, independently of any competitive advantages vis- 
à-vis other countries. We can distinguish these cases using a counterfactual test 
(Dietsch and Rixen 2014, 164): would a country have chosen the policy in question 
even if there was no prospect of capital flight? In this case, any capital inflow is just 
a fortuitous side-effect of the policy. These are cases of genuine regulatory disagreement 
rather than competition.
Regulatory competition by multiple countries has a distinctive dynamic often 
described as a ‘race to the bottom’. This is illustrated by the case of taxation in the 
simple ‘baseline model’: two identical countries sharing a common international tax 
base, each deciding what tax rate to choose (Genschel and Schwarz 2013; The model 
originated in Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). The first country has an incentive to cut 
tax rates in order to increase tax revenues by attracting some of the tax base of 
the second country. But the second country can easily win back that tax base by cutting 
its tax rates too. The two countries are left with the same share of the tax base they 
began with, only now with a lower level of taxation. The countries are in a prisoners’ 
dilemma situation that pushes tax rates and revenues in both countries below the level 
they would otherwise choose.
One important assumption in this simple model is that the two countries have 
economies of similar size. Countries sufficiently smaller than their neighbours can 
actually increase their net revenues by becoming tax havens. This is because for smaller 
countries, the increase in the tax base has a much greater effect than the decrease in the 
tax rate. However, these benefits for small tax havens only occur at the cost of greater 
losses for their larger neighbours. Many empirical studies have attempted to test these 
predictions and those based on more sophisticated models. Put crudely, the consensus 
is that tax competition has occurred, but not to the extent of the full-on ‘race to the 
bottom’ predicted by the baseline model.3 Some possible reasons for this will be 
discussed below.
The strategy of investor-friendly policy by definition runs against policies that 
discourage investment. I use the term investor-limiting policy as a shorthand for these 
contradictory policies. The most obvious element of investor-limiting policy is the 
taxation of investors, and most discussions (both empirical and normative) reduce 
regulatory competition to tax competition.4 However, other policies such as labour 
3For surveys of the literature see Clausing 2016; Devereux and Loretz 2012; Genschel and Schwarz 2013; Plümper, 
Troeger, and Winner 2009; Zodrow 2010.
4For example Avi-Yonah 2000; Dietsch 2015; Dietsch and Rixen 2014. Notable exceptions are Eichengreen 1999;; Rodrik 
2012; Sinn 2003.
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rights or environmental standards can also limit the attractiveness of a country for 
foreign investors.
As a goal, investor-limiting policy is frustrated by investor-friendly policy but can be 
achieved by the three other ideal-typical strategies of the quadrilemma: by capital 
barriers, by international harmonization, and by accepting capital flight.
Including investor-limiting policy as one of the four goals at stake means that 
something of value is sacrificed when a country chooses to abandon investor-limiting 
policy in order to better attain the other three goals of the quadrilemma. This claim can 
be justified in two ways: by appeal to justice, or by appeal to democracy.
I will take the latter approach, although the former is worth briefly discussing. The 
appeal to substantive conceptions of justice leads to the familiar left/right divide on 
economic policy. Investor-limiting policy is advocated by those with more egalitarian 
conceptions of justice and/or more optimistic views about state capacity, and criticized 
by those with more libertarian conceptions of justice and/or more pessimistic views 
about state capacity. Consequently, depending on one’s starting point capital flight can 
be either lamented (Brock 2008; Cappelen 2001) or celebrated (Hardin 2009) for its 
tendency to promote investor-friendly policy. The quadrilemma is a difficult choice for 
those on the left who see value in investor-limiting policy. However, insofar as those on 
the right deny that there are costs of investor-friendly policy, this strategy dominates 
the others and the quadrilemma disappears.
Rather than relying on a substantive conception of justice to ground the claim that 
investor-limiting policy is valuable, I will instead focus on a different normative level, 
that of democracy.5 My normative premise is that it is valuable for a government’s 
policy to reflect the preferences of its people.6 On this level, there is nothing regrettable 
in itself about a government pursuing investor-friendly policy out of what I called 
genuine regulatory disagreement. But there is something regrettable about 
a government forced to abandon investor-limiting policy because that is the only way 
it can protect its tax base without compromising capital mobility or international 
independence. What makes this case regrettable is that citizens’ first preference would 
have been to combine investor-limiting policy with the other three goals of the 
trilemma, and they must instead accept investor-friendly policy as their second pre-
ference. Investor-friendly policy is a valuable goal because it is goal that democracies 
may and indeed often have chosen to pursue.
It might be objected that the fact that investor-friendly policies lead to capital flight is 
not democratically regrettable, because it merely reveals the genuine costs of those 
policies. For example, suppose a government requires stricter environmental standards 
on producing fridges. Consequently, fewer fridges will be produced and investment in 
the industry will fall. But there is nothing sinister here: just a market efficiently 
signalling the costs of a different production process.
In reply, we can concede that investor responses to investor-limiting policies like 
environmental standards can often be characterized as efficient signals of the real costs 
of policies, in a closed economy. However, this objection does not work in an open, 
5This is also the approach taken by Dietsch 2015; Eichengreen 1999; Ronzoni 2014.
6For reasons of space, I must take this as a premise rather than offering a justification. On the justification of democracy 
see, among many others, Christiano Christiano, 2010b; Dahl 2000; Estlund 2009; Goodin and Spiekermann 2018; 
Landemore 2013; Richardson 2003; Waldron 1999; Weale 2007.
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international economy. In the context of international capital flight, investor responses 
are often inefficient and do not signal the genuine costs of policies. When choosing 
between two investment opportunities, so long as both are under the same tax and 
regulatory system, investors will choose the opportunity with the lowest costs and 
greatest benefits. However, when regulatory systems differ, investors will choose what 
would otherwise be less productive investments merely because taxes in that country 
are lower (Avi-Yonah 2000, pp. 1604–1616). Moreover, capital flight can put pressure 
not only on redistributive policies, but also on policies (like environmental standards) 
designed to remedy market failures (Sinn 2003).
Shifting from a substantive conception of justice to a theory of democracy does not 
shield my normative premise from all controversy. Defenders of regulatory competition 
may say there is nothing regrettable about democracies being deterred from what they 
say are unjust or unwise policies. I will not enter into this debate here. The democratic 
value of being able to pursue investor-limiting policy is one of my premises, not one of 
my conclusions. Leaving aside more general questions about the relationship between 
justice and democracy,7 I assume it is valuable for democracy to hold sway on topics 
such as tax rates, labour rights, environmental protections and infrastructure invest-
ments – areas that are constitutive of investor-liming policy.
I now turn to a different kind of concern, which can also be reconstructed as an 
objection to the alleged value of investor-limiting policy. I have been writing as though 
‘investor-friendly policy’ could be glossed as something like ‘neo-liberalism’. But it may 
turn out that what actually attracts real investment is more like the welfare state: 
perhaps investors are attracted to countries with good infrastructure and healthy, well- 
educated workers. Regulatory competition would then lead to a race to the top rather 
than a race to the bottom. This has been one of the main lines of criticism against the 
baseline model.8 If the policies states might want to adopt for the benefit of non- 
investors are actually consistent with a robust capital base, investor-limiting policy is 
not a valuable goal at all. Investor-friendly policy would dominate the other three ideal- 
typical strategies. Instead of an agonizing trade-off, we would have a simple solution.
One way of putting this objection to the test is by re-purposing the counterfactual 
test employed above: to what extent do policies that attract international investment 
overlap with the policies that would be chosen in a closed economy? Put this way, there 
is clearly a lot of room for overlap, but the overlap is never likely to be complete. When 
it comes to public goods, provision that optimizes for a single goal (workforce pro-
ductivity) will not perfectly coincide with provision that optimizes for a blend of 
additional goals (humanistic education or biodiversity, for example). When it comes 
to redistribution, the divergence is even starker. Perhaps there are some degrees of 
redistribution from investors to non-investors where investors actually benefit, because 
workers become more productive and consumers more spendthrift (Przeworski and 
Wallerstein 1988, 27). But this is surely the exceptional case: normally, redistribution 
from investors to others does not benefit investors.
7On which see Christiano Christiano, 2010b; Goodin 2004.
8For example Eichengreen 1999; For discussion see Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009, pp. 762–64.
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Accepting base erosion or a robust capital base
The second ideal-typical strategy available is to accept capital flight and continue as 
before. By doing so a country can allow capital mobility, pursue investor-limiting 
policies, and remain internationally independent. However, by its nature this strategy 
goes against a concern for a country’s capital base, whether this means attracting new 
investment or retaining existing capital in the country. Retaining and cultivating the 
capital base, on the other hand, can be achieved through the other three ideal-typical 
strategies in the quadrilemma: investor-friendly policy, capital barriers, and interna-
tional harmonization.
A country’s capital base is worth cultivating for two reasons. First, there is a benefit 
to economic welfare from using the capital itself. Capital investments raise productivity, 
increasing income or making it possible to expand leisure time without loss of material 
prosperity. Second, capital can be taxed. A broad tax base is instrumentally valuable for 
public spending. Public spending itself can be evaluated in the same ways as investor- 
limiting policies: either on the basis of a substantive conception of justice, or on the 
basis of democratic choice.
Accepting base erosion is an easy option to overlook. As the default option, it is 
rarely considered as a conscious strategy. Omitting it as an option suggests an 
unwarranted credulity towards claims about the capital-base costs of investor- 
limiting policies. In many cases, the impact of investor-limiting policies on the capital 
base will be relatively minor, and so it will make more sense to accept this minor 
impact rather than revising the whole policy. When investors or their political allies 
claim that we must endorse their preferred vision of society in order to keep up with 
the global race, the correct response in many cases is surely to echo Mandy Rice-Davies 
: ‘well, he would say that, wouldn’t he?’ For example, in their analysis of the Australian 
mining case, Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor (2014) conclude that the impact of 
potential capital flight was fairly insignificant in purely economic terms. The reason 
Labour politicians abandoned the tax was not because they really believed it would 
damage the economy, Rather, they believed that voters believed it would, and the 
politicians did not want voters to regard them as incompetent or irresponsible. 
Moreover, both the public’s perception of the risk posed and politicians’ perception 
of the public’s perception were strongly influenced by the spirited public relations 
campaign of the mining industry.
The possibility of simply accepting base erosion is also integral to economic models 
of tax competition. Countries in the baseline model maximize their tax revenues by 
setting a tax rate that optimally trades off between two effects of (higher) tax rates: 
revenue gained because of the higher rate itself (the investor-friendly/limiting policy 
dimension) and revenue lost because of a smaller tax base after capital flight (the 
accepting base erosion/robust capital base dimension). Empirically, the very fact that 
regulatory competition has not yet led to a general race to the bottom suggests (in the 
absence of serious attempts at harmonization or capital controls) that acceptance has 
been the most common response to the quadrilemma in the world so far. Because states 
can choose to accept base erosion, we cannot directly infer the influence of capital flight 
from looking only at general trends in tax rates (or other policies). The influence of 
capital flight might instead show up as a (relative) decline in capital base.
206 M. BENNETT
Perhaps the most important line of objection to the baseline model has been that 
states cannot simply be modelled as tax-revenue-maximizers. Political scientists have 
amended the model to incorporate more complex decision-making processes within the 
state (Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009, pp. 764–765). From my perspective, these 
amendments strengthen rather than weaken the case for a quadrilemma. That investor- 
friendly policy has not been the universal response to the quadrilemma is precisely 
because governments care about goals others than maximizing revenue. Different 
countries have responded to capital flight in different ways (Plümper, Troeger, and 
Winner 2009, 781), and this is what we would expect if we understand their responses 
as preferences for different trade-offs among the goals of the quadrilemma.
Accepting base erosion is the option which seems to be missing from Rodrik’s 
trilemma. However, the comparison between his trilemma and the quadrilemma is 
not straightforward. As noted above, his subject matter is much broader, and he does 
not specifically claim that a trilemma applies to real capital flight, although this is 
a natural reading.9 Moreover, Rodrik’s trilemma can be preserved insofar as the 
normative importance of both the capital base and of investor-limiting policy can 
both be evaluated in terms of the value of democracy. Nonetheless, it is important to 
distinguish between these two different ways in which a country’s democratic choices 
can be reduced, and Rodrik’s trilemma does not allow this. A country might well choose 
to preserve demanding environmental or labour laws and accept that the cost of doing 
so is less investment and tax revenue. This is a very different approach than that of 
a country which de-regulates in order to attract investment. Putting the former option 
on the table mitigates Rodrik’s push for capital barriers or international harmonization 
as the only democratic options.10
Indeed, some might push this point still further, and argue that the costs of accepting 
base erosion are so minor that this option dominates the others in the quadrilemma. 
However, while economic fundamentals such as labour costs and infrastructure matter 
more for investment location decisions, even small differences extended over a long 
enough time period can accumulate to a significant impact. Moreover, an important 
possibility suggested by empirical scholars such as Kimberly Clausing (2016) and 
George Zodrow (2010) is that the relative moderation of real tax competition thus far 
may itself be partly due to the prevalence of virtual tax competition. If states can 
succeed in making it harder for companies to avoid paying tax where their economic 
9The strategies in Rodrik’s (2012) trilemma are ‘Global Governance’ (corresponding to what I refer to as international 
harmonization), the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ (corresponding to investor-friendly policy) and the ‘Bretton Woods compro-
mise’ (corresponding to capital barriers). Looking at Rodrik’s earlier work one can see how his political trilemma 
hypothesis grew out of an extension of the monetary policy trilemma rather than from reflecting on the case of real 
capital flight (Rodrik 2000). In his brief specific discussion of corporate tax competition, Rodrik is very focused on the 
change (the extent to which rates have been reduced), and does not discuss the continuity (the extent to which 
corporate profits continue to be taxed) (Rodrik 2012, pp. 193–194). While I think Rodrik’s analysis of real capital flight 
is somewhat simplistic, I do not really regard this as a criticism, given the scope of his work. I see the capital flight 
quadrilemma rather as a deeper and more precise analysis of this particular aspect of the broader theme.
10Rodrik’s own normative preference for democracy pushes him towards either capital barriers or international 
harmonization. Of the two, he opts for capital barriers, leaning on what I refer to below as the ‘non-ideal democratic’ 
argument to criticize the international harmonization strategy. Interestingly, when Rodrik first introduced the 
trilemma in his earlier work (2000), he made the prediction that ‘In the next 100 years or so, I see a world in 
which the reach of markets, jurisdictions, and politics are each truly and commensurately global as the most likely 
outcome. I may also be biased, since that is the option that I personally like best.’ While this is technically compatible 
with his later (2012) stance, when he returned to the subject a decade later (a period which included the financial 
crisis) his emphasis shifted strongly towards retrenching the nation-state.
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activities are really located, companies will have stronger incentives to respond to 
regulatory differences when locating their real investments. Solving the problem of 
virtual tax competition will thus only render the capital flight quadrilemma more 
prominent. Ultimately, the empirical question of how far states have suffered from 
pursuing more investor-limiting policies has not been settled and it is not my purpose 
to do so. Instead, this article attempts to clarify the extensive debate around capital 
flight by theorizing of the underlying structure of the trade-offs involved.
We should also ask how far the apparent viability of accepting base erosion actually 
instead reflects the persistence of one of the other strategies: capital barriers. This brings 
us to the third element in the trade-off.
Capital barriers or capital mobility
The first two strategies accept (enthusiastically or resignedly) the tendency of investors 
to seek investor-friendly jurisdictions. The remaining two strategies attempt to elim-
inate capital flight by removing one of the conditions of its existence – capital mobility 
in the first case, international policy variation in the second. These strategies are not 
being pursued seriously by any countries at present. For this reason they tend to be 
absent in empirical discussions of capital flight and regulatory competition.
This section considers barriers against capital flight: By putting up barriers, a country 
can retain its capital base while pursue investor-limiting policies, without loss of 
international independence. Of course, this comes at the cost of capital mobility, 
which could instead be advanced through the strategies of investor-friendly policy, 
international harmonization or accepting base erosion.
Capital barriers can be natural or artificial. Artificial barriers are known as capital 
outflow controls. The simplest form is a proportional tax on outgoing capital, up to 
a full 100% (a complete ban). As a lesser step, some authors have suggested that a small 
general financial transactions tax (Tobin tax) would help ameliorate regulatory compe-
tition (Ronzoni 2014, 52). Any artificial barriers to capital mobility would supplement 
natural barriers that already exist.
Natural barriers have been another important way of explaining why the complete 
race to the bottom predicted by the baseline model has not occurred. These barriers 
take the form of things like transport costs, exchange rate uncertainties, fear of 
expropriation, and limited knowledge of foreign investment opportunities (Sinn 2003; 
Zodrow 2010). Insofar as there are natural barriers, this simply means that 
a government’s response to the quadrilemma is to that extent pre-determined rather 
than up for choice. The corollary of this has not been recognized: when governments 
seek to reduce natural barriers (for example by improving transport infrastructure or 
concluding investment treaties with foreign states), any increased capital mobility that 
results must come at the expense of one of the other goals of the quadrilemma. Thus, 
even if we suppose that accepting base erosion is relatively painless at present, the costs 
of this approach may well mount as natural barriers to capital mobility are continuing 
to decline (Zodrow 2010).
Complete barriers to capital mobility mean a country has a closed economy when it 
comes to capital transactions. In such a country, capital could not leave in search of 
a more investor-friendly environment elsewhere, and so the regulatory policies of other 
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countries would cease to have an impact on a country’s capital base. Capital barriers at 
lesser levels reduce the loss of capital base that ensues when a country pursues investor- 
limiting policy.
By definition, capital barriers come at the cost of capital mobility. Capital mobility is 
treated as a goal in the quadrilemma because it allows greater gains from trade. If 
capital is not mobile, investments will not be made where they are most efficient. For 
example, with capital outflow controls, domestic investors looking abroad must bear in 
mind the added cost of capital controls, and foreign investors will be deterred from 
entering the country by the knowledge that it will be expensive if they later choose to 
leave. This creates an absolute ‘deadweight’ loss of economic welfare. Some of this loss 
may accrue to foreigners, but much will accrue to residents of the state in question. 
Countries that need to attract capital from abroad face a particularly acute problem. 
Capital outflow controls are only helpful if a country actually has capital to begin with; 
it is something of a solution for a first-world problem (Przeworski and Wallerstein 
1988, 20). This is another way of saying that for some countries, for reasons beyond 
their control, capital mobility may be an especially important goal.
I now briefly consider four objections to the use of capital controls, aside from their 
fundamental cost in terms of capital mobility.
The first and most basic objection to capital controls is the claim that capital strikes 
can still occur in a closed economy. If this were the case, there would still be pressure 
towards investor-friendly policies, and so private investment decisions would still 
influence democratic decision-making. However, this claim was put to rest by Adam 
Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein’s (1988) analysis of the structural dependency of 
the state on capital. Przeworski and Wallerstein’s analysis shows that a state with 
a closed economy can move directly against the interests of investors without fear of 
negative economic consequences. They show that taxes in a closed economy can be 
designed to eliminate negative incentives on investment that might otherwise deter 
governments from the policy. Taking away investors’ money is the type of policy that 
most obviously limits investors’ interests. Thus, if states with closed economies are not 
constrained to avoid even this direct assault on investors’ interests, we can take it as 
strong evidence that they are not economically constrained to avoid investor-limiting 
policy more generally.
Although the details of their model are complex, the essence of Przeworski and 
Wallerstein’s argument is relatively simple. The longstanding worry that taxing inves-
tors reduces investment is valid when it comes to simple taxes on income. However, 
a government concerned with maintaining private investment while raising revenue can 
avoid this trade-off simply by exempting investment from taxation. Exempting invest-
ment from taxation would remove any disincentives to invest and place the burden of 
taxes entirely on consumption (expenditure). This is consistent with a very high tax 
rates and highly redistributive policies. The conclusion is subject to a caveat, which is 
that there will be transition costs during the anticipation period between the announce-
ment and implementation of a tax (Przeworski and Wallerstein 1988, 23). Investors will 
tend to reduce investment during the anticipation period, aiming to consume now 
while consumption is cheap rather than later when it will be taxed. Once this transition 
cost is paid, however, governments in closed economies can pursue more or less 
investor-friendly policies without impacting on investment decisions. This in turn 
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means investment decisions need not impact on democratic decisions about whether to 
pursue a more or less investor-friendly policy.
A second objection to capital outflow controls is to doubt their effectiveness (Dietsch 
2015; Eichengreen 1999). Investors whose capital is trapped in a country have a strong 
incentive to circumvent the controls, for example by disguising capital transactions as 
over-priced commercial transactions. How far capital outflow controls can be designed 
to have their intended effect is an open empirical question, and difficult to answer until 
we can observe a serious attempt at implementation under contemporary conditions. 
With an eye on such worries, Dietsch (2015, 69) claims that capital outflow controls are 
in any case unnecessary to defend the tax base so long as a state can effectively tax 
foreign-source income. While it is true that taxing foreign-source income is preferable 
where possible, this only works where the investor remains a taxable citizen of the home 
country. If the investor moves along with their capital or resides in a third country, only 
capital controls can prevent capital flight.
A third objection to capital controls is that they are difficult to publicly deliberate 
about in advance, something potentially regrettable from a democratic perspective. For 
maximum effectiveness, capital controls should be introduced without warning in the 
dead of night. This is because anticipation effects are likely to be particularly strong, 
with investors trying to get out quickly before the controls are implemented.
A final problem (from the perspective of an individual state) is that permanent 
capital outflow controls have historically been opposed by the World Trade 
Organization and the International Monetary Fund, and may even prompt sanctions. 
Of course, this is a policy choice by these bodies, the justice or legitimacy of which can 
be questioned.
International harmonization or international independence
The final strategy states may pursue is international harmonization. International 
harmonization reduces the national differences that are one of the necessary conditions 
for capital flight. It effectively turns all the participating countries into one big closed 
economy. As we saw in the previous section, in a closed economy a state can carry out 
investor-limiting policies without loss of investment. Participating countries maintain 
capital mobility without compromising their capital bases. However, international 
harmonization comes at the cost of international independence, a goal which can 
instead be advanced through strategies of capital barriers, investor-friendly policy or 
accepting base erosion.
Unlike the other ideal-typical strategies, harmonization will almost certainly have to 
be supplemented with some element of an alternative strategy. As long as some other 
countries do not wish to harmonize or cannot be forced to do so, the harmonizing bloc 
will have to adopt one of the other three strategies with respect to those outsiders. The 
bloc must either (a) accept capital flight to outsiders, (b) adopt a relatively investor- 
liming policy in order to prevent capital flight (which would tend to remove the point 
of harmonization), or (c) enforce capital controls on transactions to outsiders. The fact 
that harmonization needs to be supplemented with another strategy is often overlooked 
by its advocates. Dietsch (2015), for example, endorses harmonization on a minimal 
investor-limiting policy. Yet, he does not envisage any problem of capital flight to 
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outsider countries, and he rejects the use of capital controls. Technically, there is no 
inconsistency in Dietsch’s stance, because his ideal theory is about what all countries 
should do; but this leaves us no guidance about what should be done if some countries 
do not follow his prescription.
International harmonization contradicts a goal I refer to as international indepen-
dence. This is because harmonization requires individual member-states to subordinate 
their own policy preferences to the policies agreed for the bloc as a whole. Of course, 
the extent to which independence is compromised reflects the depth of harmonization. 
There might also be a loss of independence for states outside the harmonizing bloc 
which feel pressured to adopt the bloc’s policies in order to avoid being subject to 
capital controls. Their loss of independence would be even more severe since they 
would have no say at all in shaping the bloc’s policies.
There are at least four different reasons why one might value international indepen-
dence of the kind that is reduced by international policy harmonization.
First (and most often invoked in discussions of capital flight (Dietsch and Rixen 
2014; Ronzoni 2014)) is a ‘liberal’ argument for international independence: policy- 
making on a national as opposed to regional or global level allows for a more fine- 
grained responsiveness to local policy preferences.
Second is an ‘experimental’ case for international independence, advanced by J.M. 
Keynes (1933) in the context of capital flight.11 Keynes stressed the epistemic value 
realized by different countries experimenting with different economic systems. For 
Keynes, facilitating such experiments was a reason to adopt capital controls to limit 
the homogenizing effects of capital mobility and regulatory competition.
Third is a ‘non-ideal democratic’ argument for international independence. If serious 
policy decisions are made at the level of a harmonized international bloc, these 
decisions should made democratically. However, democracy at this kind of geographical 
scale and level of diversity may not be feasible. Streeck (2017, 188) puts this argument 
in its starkest terms: ‘in the world as it is, democracy cannot be had without state 
sovereignty.’12
Finally, there is a ‘communitarian’ case for international independence. Citizens 
often seem to view international independence as intrinsically valuable. Whether or 
not we agree with this view, their preferences may hold some weight.
International independence is used here as a term of art referring strictly to inde-
pendence vis-à-vis other states. It should not be confused with a state’s ability to set 
policy more generally.13 International independence normally contributes to a state’s 
ability to set policy more generally. However, a country that prioritizes cultivating 
foreign investment above all else would have no remaining space for policy decisions, 
even if it retained full international independence. The liberal, experimental and 
democratic arguments would apply equally strongly against such a course of action. 
These three arguments thus function mainly to recommend capital barriers or accept-
ing base erosion rather than international harmonization or investor-friendly policy. 
11For discussion see Crotty 1983.
12For a contrary view see Weinstock 2009.
13My distinction between ‘international independence’ and ‘ability to set policy more generally’ maps Ronzoni’s (2012) 
distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive sovereignty’. Dietsch 2015, Chapter 4 uses a similar distinction.
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However, the communitarian case for independence applies only against international 
harmonization, and does not also provide an argument against investor-friendly policy.
In some situations countries adopt relatively similar policies as a result of genuine 
regulatory agreement rather than deliberate harmonization. According to the experi-
mental argument for international independence, this kind of accidental harmonization 
is still something to be regretted. However, this is not the case for the other three 
arguments. On those accounts, to the extent that harmonization occurs accidentally 
through regulatory agreement, the quadrilemma is genuinely mitigated and progress is 
possible on all four goals at once. Nonetheless, a wide range of genuine regulatory 
disagreement between countries is unlikely to disappear any time soon.
Representing the quadrilemma
Putting together these various goals and strategies, we have the capital flight quad-
rilemma, represented above in Table 1 in terms of ideal-typical strategies. I will now 
describe a better way of representing the four-way trade-off, not as a choice between 
four discrete options but as the choice of a point in a continuous space of options.
Only very rarely do states adopt one of the pure ideal-typical strategies. Normally, 
states will adopt a mixture with elements of each. For example, a state might be part of 
some broad harmonizing bloc setting some minimal standards of investor-limiting 
policy. To protect the bloc, this will require capital controls on outsider countries. At 
the same time, within the minimally harmonizing bloc, the country might make some 
attempt to offer taxes and regulations that are attractive to investors, while also 
accepting some degree of base erosion to more competitive jurisdictions. A state’s 
choice is thus about the proportions in which to mix the four ideal-types.
To represent this choice, I start with the simpler case of a three-way trade-off. 
Figure 1 represents the trade-off between investor-limiting policies, capital mobility 
and international independence (see below). Different policy choices are represented by 
different points within the triangle. The distance between a point and one of the 
triangle’s sides represents how well that policy realizes a goal. Thus, the closer a point 
is to the bottom of the triangle, the better it realizes the goal of investor-limiting policy. 
This is why the three ideal-typical strategies sit in the corners of the triangle. The pure 
strategy of capital barriers, for example, sits as close as possible to the lines representing 
international independence and investor-limiting policies, but is as far as possible from 
the line representing capital mobility. International harmonization, by contrast, is as 
close as possible to investor-limiting policies and capital mobility but as far as possible 
from international independence. A point at the very centre of the triangle would 
represent the mixed policy of a state which combined some capital barriers, some 
international harmonization, and some effort to attract international investors.
Of course, Figure 1 only shows a trilemma, not a quadrilemma. What Figure 1 is 
missing is the possibility of simply accepting some base erosion. Put another way, 
Figure 1 assumes that the goal of a robust capital base is non-negotiable. In order to 
represent this fourth goal, we need an extra dimension. Imagine there is a fourth corner 
to Figure 1 situated above the centre of diagram, representing the ideal-typical strategy 
of accepting base erosion. Instead of a triangle, we now have a three-sided pyramid. 
Policy positions are now represented by a position within the volume of the pyramid, 
212 M. BENNETT
and each goal is represented by a different face. The pyramid is shown in Figure 2 
below, with the four ideal-typical strategies labelled at the four vertices.
The strategy a country should choose depends on how it evaluates the trade-off 
between the four goals. This has two elements. First, there are empirical questions about 
how any given strategy will perform with respect to each goal. For example, what are 
the economic costs of different levels of capital controls, if they can be made effective? 
How much capital flight will there actually be under different combinations of policy, 









































Figure 2. The capital flight quadrilemma as tetrahedron.
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the choices of other countries. For example, to the extent that other countries adopt 
strongly investor-friendly policies, choosing to accept base erosion comes at a greater 
cost to the capital base.
Second, there are normative or evaluative questions about how trade-offs between 
the four goals should be weighed. Democracy requires that the strategy a country 
chooses should reflect the judgements of its citizens about the relative values of the 
four goals. One important implication of this is that international bodies such as the 
IMF and WTO should cease their unqualified opposition to long-term capital outflow 
controls. The opposition to capital controls implies a belief that capital mobility is more 
important than the other three goals of the trilemma. But this cannot be defended in all 
situations, and in any case it is a choice that democracies should make for themselves.
The value of democracy does not, however, preclude theorists from offering argu-
ments about what relative valuation of the goals they believe is appropriate. As already 
mentioned, the trade-off should at least be sensitive to the situation of the country in 
question. In particular, poorer countries for which economic growth is more morally 
urgent should generally value capital mobility and the capital base more highly than 
richer countries for which it is not.14
Conclusion
The central claim of this article has been that countries face a four-way trade-off 
between capital mobility, investor-limiting policies, international independence, and 
the capital base. This is the primary way private investment decisions can impede 
democratic decision-making. The free movement of investments must come at the 
expense of at least one of the other goals in the quadrilemma. And these other goals 
all reflect the value of democracy in different ways. It is valuable that states can pursue 
investor-limiting policy and a robust capital base because democracies should be free to 
pursue economic and social policies of their choosing. International independence too 
has important democratic elements. Independence allows experimentation and respon-
siveness to local preferences and reflects the value people place on national indepen-
dence. Moreover, national states thus far have a better democratic track record than 
supranational institutions. While the quadrilemma shows how international capitalism 
can conflict with democracy, I submit that we understand the issue more clearly when 
we disaggregate the different democratic elements at stake into the different goals of the 
quadrilemma. This is the best way of conceptualizing the issue of regulatory (including 
tax) competition in normative terms. Because of the trade-off, there can be no such 
thing as a ‘solution’ to real capital flight: all options come with costs.
I analysed the quadrilemma as a decision each country should make based on its 
interests in each of the four goals. In the first instance, the balancing between the goods 
of capitalism and democracy must take place at this level. However, as we have seen, the 
choice one country makes will also affect how far other countries are able to meet the 
four goals. An important goal for further research is thus a framework for fairly 
balancing different countries’ preferences for responding to the quadrilemma.
14Although see Eichengreen 1999 for some countervailing considerations.
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In the medium term, political actors concerned by tax competition can make 
substantial and important progress in tackling ‘virtual’ competition over facilitating 
tax avoidance. A fair system for accounting for profits across borders need not require 
compromises between private investment and democracy. However, the point of the 
capital flight quadrilemma is that such a compromise is ultimately unavoidable when it 
comes to real investment. If globalization continues, how to respond to the quadri-
lemma is a question that will only become more urgent in the coming century.
Disclosure statement




A Capital Strike. (2009, January 31). Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB123336321034435421
Avi-Yonah, R. S. 2000. “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State.” Harvard Law Review 113 (7): 1573–1676. doi:10.2307/1342445.
Barry, B. 2002. “Capitalists Rule Ok? Some Puzzles About Power.” Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics 1 (2): 155–184. doi:10.1177/1470594X02001002001.
Bell, S., and A. Hindmoor. 2014. “The Structural Power of Business and the Power of Ideas: The 
Strange Case of the Australian Mining Tax.” New Political Economy 19 (3): 470–486. 
doi:10.1080/13563467.2013.796452.
Block, F. 1977. “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State.” 
Socialist Revolution 33 (7): 6–28.
Brock, G. 2008. “Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between Theory and Practice.” 
Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (2): 161–184. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.2008.00422.x.
Burke, M. (2012, August 4). The Investment Strike Is One the Government Would Do Well to 
Bust. The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/aug/04/investment- 
strike-business-economy
Cappelen, A. W. 2001. “The Moral Rationale for International Fiscal Law.” Ethics & International 
Affairs 15 (1): 97–110. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2001.tb00346.x.
Christiano, T. 2010a. “The Uneasy Relationship between Democracy and Capital.” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 27 (1): 195–217. doi:10.1017/S0265052509990082.
Christiano, T. 2010b. The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Clausing, K. A. 2016. “The Nature and Practice of Tax Competition.” In Global Tax Governance: 
What’s Wrong, and How to Fix It, edited by P. Dietsch, and T. Rixen, 27–53, Colchester: ECPR 
Press.
Cohen, J. 1989. “The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy.” Social Philosophy and Policy 
6 (2): 25–50. doi:10.1017/S0265052500000625.
Crotty, J. R. 1983. “On Keynes and Capital Flight.” Journal of Economic Literature 21 (1): 59–65.
Dahl, R. A. 2000. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Devereux, M., and S. Loretz (2012). What Do We Know about Corporate Tax Competition? 
(Working Paper No. 1229). Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. https://ideas. 
repec.org/p/btx/wpaper/1229.html
ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 215
Dietsch, P., and T. Rixen. 2014. “Tax Competition and Global Background Justice.” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 22 (2): 150–177. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2012.00419.x.
Dietsch, P., and T. Rixen, Eds. 2016. Global Tax Governance: What’s Wrong, and How to Fix It. 
Colchester: ECPR Press.
Dietsch, P. 2015. Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax Competition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Eichengreen, B. 1999. “The Global Gamble on Financial Liberalization: Reflections on Capital 
Mobility National Autonomy, and Social Justice.” Ethics & International Affairs 13 (1): 
205–226. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00335.x.
Estlund, D. 2009. Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeston: Princeton 
University Press.
Frase, P. (2011,September 19). The Right’s Favorite Strike. Jacobin. https://www.jacobinmag. 
com/2011/09/the-rights-favorite-strike/
Genschel, P., and P. Schwarz. 2013. “Tax Competition and Fiscal Democracy.” In Politics in the 
Age of Austerity, edited by W. Streeck, and A. Schäfer, 59–83, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Goodin, R. E., and K. Spiekermann. 2018. An Epistemic Theory of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Goodin, R. E. 2004. “Democracy, Justice and Impartiality.” In Justice and Democracy: Essays for 
Brian Barry, edited by K. Dowding, C. Pateman, and R. E. Goodin. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hardin, R. 2009. “Deliberative Democracy.” In Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, 
edited by T. Christiano, and J. Christman. Malden: John Wiley & Sons.
Kalecki, M. 1943. “Political Aspects of Full Employment.” The Political Quarterly 14 (4): 
322–330. doi:10.1111/j.1467-923X.1943.tb01016.x.
Kennedy, D. 1999. Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keynes, J. M. 1933. “National Self-Sufficiency.” The Yale Review 33 (4): 755–769.
Landemore, H. 2013. Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the 
Many. Princeston: Princeton University Press.
Lawford-Smith, H. 2013. “Understanding Political Feasibility.” Journal of Political Philosophy 
21 (3): 243–259. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9760.2012.00422.x.
Lindblom, C. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems. New York: 
Basic Books.
Lindblom, C. 1982. “The Market as Prison.” The Journal of Politics 44 (2): 323–336. doi:10.2307/ 
2130588.
Plümper, T., V. E. Troeger, and H. Winner. 2009. “Why Is There No Race to the Bottom in 
Capital Taxation?” International Studies Quarterly 53 (3): 761–786. doi:10.1111/j.1468- 
2478.2009.00555.x.
Pogge, T., and K. Mehta, Eds. 2016. Global Tax Fairness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Przeworski, A., and M. Wallerstein. 1988. “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital.” The 
American Political Science Review 82 (1) : 11–29, doi:10/bhh3kv.
Richardson, H. S. 2003. Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends of Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Robeyns, I. 2008. “Ideal Theory in Theory and Practice.” Social Theory and Practice 34 (3): 
341–362. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200834321.
Rodrik, D. 2000. “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14 (1): 177–186. doi:10.1257/jep.14.1.177.
Rodrik, D. 2012. The Globalization Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ronzoni, M. 2009. “The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A Practice-Dependent 
Account.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (3): 229–256. doi:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01159.x.
Ronzoni, M. 2012. “Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and Their Implications for Global 
Institutional Design.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 15 (5): 
573–591. doi:10.1080/13698230.2012.727306.
216 M. BENNETT
Ronzoni, M. 2014. “Global Tax Governance: The Bullets Internationalists Must Bite – And Those 
They Must Not.” Moral Philosophy and Politics 1 (1): 37–59. doi:10.1515/mopp-2013-0015.
Sinn, H.-W. 2003. The New Systems Competition. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Stemplowska, Z., and A. Swift. 2012. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Philosophy, edited by D. Estlund, 373–389, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Streeck, W. 2017. Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. Second edition 
London: Verso.
Swift, A. 2008. “The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances.” Social Theory and Practice 
34 (3): 363–387. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract200834322.
Van Apeldoorn, L. 2018. “BEPS, Tax Sovereignty and Global Justice.” Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (4): 478–499. doi:10.1080/ 
13698230.2016.1220149.
Waldron, J. 1999. Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weale, A. 2007. Democracy. 2nd ed. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weinstock, D. 2009. “Motivating the Global Demos.” Metaphilosophy 40 (1): 92–108. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01569.x.
White, S. 2011. “The Republican Critique of Capitalism.” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 14 (5): 561–579. doi:10.1080/13698230.2011.617119.
Zodrow, G. R., and P. Mieszkowski. 1986. “Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and the 
Underprovision of Local Public Goods.” Journal of Urban Economics 19 (3): 356–370. 
doi:10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3.
Zodrow, G. R. 2010. “Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition.” National Tax Journal 
63 (4): 865–901. doi:10.17310/ntj.2010.4S.03.
ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 217
